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MEMORANDUM

In perusing the article on the U. S. intelligence system in the New York HERALD-TRIBUNE of 2 August 1950, much misinformation is mixed in with many conjectures.

The article lists "five major failures" by the intelligence services prior to the outbreak of the Korean war. Comments on these statements follow:

1. "The Fall of Czechoslovakia." On 19 September 1947, CIA pointed out that the Czechoslovak Communists were pursuing a deliberate policy designed to "weaken if not destroy" the National Front government. On 13 October 1947, CIA estimated that the Kremlin had abandoned its program of parliamentary cooperation with non-Communist parties and had reverted to the original program of control and support of international revolutionary Communism. Four days before the coup, CIA estimated that the Czechoslovak Communists might well precipitate a political crisis, resulting in the breakdown of the National Front government.

2. "Tito's defection." Tito did not defect; he was expelled from the Cominform on 28 June 1948. In May 1948, CIA noted that Tito was taking energetic steps to purge the Yugoslav Communist Party of diversionists, and on 10 June reported that the Yugoslav Government was groping for a policy which would make it once again "the Balkan spear-head of evangelical and expansionist Communism." When Yugoslavia defied the USSR on 20 June by insisting that the Danube Conference be held at Belgrade, CIA estimated the Kremlin faced a serious problem in reconciling within the Satellite states the conflict between national interests and international Communism.

3. "The Fall of the Chinese Nationalists." CIA predicted the elimination of Nationalist China from the mainland time after time. ORE 77-418 (December 1948) estimated that "The rapid disintegration of the Nationalist Army indicates that organized resistance to the military forces of the Chinese Communist Party will probably cease within a few months...."

4. "Palestine." CIA did not overestimate the capabilities of the Arab forces. However, CIA failed to anticipate that the Jews would receive such extensive outside aid that Israeli military capabilities would be greatly increased. CIA also failed to predict that the truces imposed by the UN would prevent implementation of the Arabs' long-range attrition tactics. CIA correctly estimated that Arab-Israeli hostilities would occur as a result of partition and that the resultant instability throughout the Near East would seriously affect US strategic interests.

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5. "Bogota." This is a rehash of previously reported mis-statements. In this case, CIA was given a completely clean "bill of health" as a result of an investigation by a Congressional Committee composed of Representatives Brown (R), Ohio, Hoffman (R), Michigan, and McCormack (D), Massachusetts.

In a fairly accurate account of U. S. intelligence operations, the article characterizes as "duplication" the simultaneous examination of the basic documents by CIA and the other intelligence agencies. It ought to be pointed out, however, that such duplication is inevitable and desirable inasmuch as CIA examines these documents from the standpoint of national security whereas each of the other intelligence agencies examines them from the standpoint of departmental responsibilities.

The article correctly charges that the services withhold planning and operational information from CIA and that this hampers CIA in fulfilling its mission. Under the pressure of the Korean situation there has been some improvement in this matter.

CIA recognizes the danger, which is pointed out in the article, that the services have a tendency to reflect their own interests in their intelligence estimates. For this reason, CIA strives to maintain in its estimates an objective, balanced view, and to keep U. S. national security, rather than departmental interests, as the dominant consideration.

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ES/NSC

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